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SURVEY OF WASHINGTON LAW
a "contested case." Since the two former methods would require the
bringing of a suit to determine whether the APA applies to the Board,
doubt can best be resolved by the legislature acting to bring the actions
of the Liquor Control Board unambiguously within the provisions of
the APA.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVIL INSPECTION WITHOUT
WARRANT OR PROBABLE CAUSE
The Seattle Municipal Code requires intermittent inspections by
the fire chief of nonresidential buildings for the purpose of discovering
and correcting fire hazards.' Pursuant to the Code, an inspector, with-
out a search warrant and without cause to believe that a fire hazard
existed, sought entry into defendant's locked warehouse. Upon his
refusal to allow entrance, defendant was tried and convicted for failing
to submit to a fire inspection.2 On appeal, the conviction was affirmed.
Held: The fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search
and seizure is not violated by a conviction for refusal to permit
entrance into a commercial building for purposes of a fire inspection
authorized by a municipal ordinance, even though the inspector does
not have a search warrant or probable cause to believe that a fire haz-
ard exists. City of Seattle v. See, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 465, 408 P.2d 262
(1965).
The adage that prevention is better than cure has prompted munici-
palities to employ building inspections to detect and minimize hazards
created by increased urbanization. That such a practice may raise
fourth amendment questions concerning rights of privacy is well illus-
trated by the United States Supreme Court's divided attitude toward
the status of these inspections.' The principal case represents the
first consideration in Washington of this conflict between public de-
'SEATLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CoDE § 8.01.050 (1959).
2SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8.01.050 (1959) provides that the fire chief
may enter all buildings, other than residences, for the purpose of inspections. Sec-
tion 8.01.140 provides that anyone who fails to comply with any provision of the fire
code shall be subject to certain criminal penalties. While no provision expressly
requires a building owner to permit an inspector's entry, the case proceeded on that
assumption. For a contrary ruling on this question, see City of St. Louis v. Evans,
337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960).
'Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), was a 5-4 decision, while Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959), was affirmed by an equally divided court. It has
been frequently suggested that personnel changes on the Court would result in con-
trary decisions if those cases were now presented. See, e.g., Comment, 11 VILL. L.
REV. 357, 368-69 (1966).
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mands for prevention through inspections and individual rights of
privacy
4
The court recognized that the inspection involved in the principal
case differed from inspections which had been upheld in its former
decisions, since the warehouse in question did not constitute a regu-
lated activity.5 Relying heavily on Frank v. Maryland' and Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price,7 the court reasoned that administrative inspections
could be conducted without a search warrant or probable cause, even
though the inspected premises were not otherwise regulated, because
of the fundamental distinction between regulatory inspections and
those involved in criminal law enforcement. Following the rationale of
Frank that the fourth amendment's primary area of application is to
criminal searches and seizures, the court noted that, in this case, "there
was no threat of criminal penalty even if fire hazards were detected,"'
so that constitutional safeguards were less stringent. The court also
emphasized that Frank and Eaton were concerned with inspections of
private dwellings, while the principal case dealt with a commercial
building, suggesting that even the dissenters in Frank would have
applied a different standard under these circumstances. From these
propositions the court balanced the conflicting interests and concluded
that the need for routine fire inspections, for which probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant could not ordinarily be established, out-
weighed the warehouse owner's right of privacy and thereby met the
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment.
That fourth amendment protection extends to commercial establish-
ments in criminal cases is beyond question.' In such instances, nothing
less than a search warrant issued upon probable cause, or a search
incident to a valid arrest, will satisfy the amendment's requirements.'"
When the immediate purpose of the search, however, is not to acquire
'In Kelleher v. Minshull, 11 Wn. 2d 380, 119 P.2d 302 (1941), civil inspection of
small loan business records pursuant to a state statute was upheld against a challenge
under the state constitution. WAsH. CoNsT. art. I, § 7 does not require probable cause
or a warrant. Kelleher preceded Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which made
the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
applicable to the states.
See State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 110 Pac. 792 (1910) (inspection of hotels);
Kelleher v. Minshull, supra note 4 (inspection of small loan business records).
Arguably, all businesses are regulated activities since they are required to comply
with numerous requirements, e.g., zoning, taxing, and labor regulations.
6359 U.S. 360 (1959).
'360 U.S. 246 (1959).
8 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 474, 408 P.2d at 268.
'E.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) ; Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921).
'" Compare Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), uith United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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evidence for criminal prosecution, but rather to inspect for fire haz-
ards, the probable cause requirement assumes a different perspective.
While judicial reaction to attempted searches during the infancy of
administrative agencies was predictably hostile, 1 courts relaxed their
application of the fourth amendment to administrative investigations
as recognition of the necessity for active government increased. 2
Judicial acquiescence in legislative exercises of police power, particu-
larly over economic matters, had generally left commercial privacy
protected only by a required showing of reasonableness of the legis-
lative judgment.3 That this has become a substitute for probable
cause and a warrant does not, however, signify the demise of fourth
amendment application to civil inspections of commercial establish-
ments. Legislative reasonableness may constitute probable cause,' 4
and statutory authority to inspect may constitute a warrant, 5 but the
issue of reasonableness as applied to a particular inspection, an issue
not discussed in the principal case, necessarily remains a judicial ques-
tion.' As Justice Douglas observed, "history shows that all officers
tend to be officious.. . ."1 The requirement of reasonableness, as an-
nounced in the principal case, must still be determined upon the facts
"In FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924), Justice Holmes said,
"It is contrary to first principles of justice to allow a search... in the hope that
something will turn up." See generally 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§
3.05-.06 (1958).
'
2 See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
' Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); United States
v. Kanan, 225 F. Supp. 711 (D. Ariz. 1963). For a discussion of the historical
recognition of needed protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, even in
the absence of criminal jeopardy, see Comment, 44 MIlNx. L. REv. 513, 521-27 (1960).
"The court in the principal case observed that probable cause, in the ordinary
context, could not normally be established for civil inspections. 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at
475, 408 P.2d at 268. In Comment, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth
Amcndment-A Rationale, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 288 (1965), it is suggested that search
warrants for civil inspections would be of dubious value and would merely result
in a dilution of the probable cause requirement.
" See Camara v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 136, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965), appeal docketed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3335 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1966) (No.
1139); City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960). WASH. Rrv. CODE
§ 35.22.280(24),(31),(36) (1965), contain the statutory authority for enactment of
municipal ordinances necessary for public health and safety, and authorizes prescrib-
ing of penalties for violations.
" See Way, Application of the Fourth Amendment to Civil Proceedings, 14 FooD
DRUG Cosm. L.J. 534, 545-46 (1959):
[T]he distinctions between civil proceedings to which the government is a
party and criminal proceedings obscure the fundamental question of whether the
government has committed an unreasonable search and seizure.... In the interest
of the government as well as the individual, the government must have the power
to undertake civil proceedings in these areas. This power, however, does not
need to carry with it any right to proceed in a lawless fashion.
"Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 36, 382 (1959) (dissent).
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by considering the time and circumstances of inspection, evidence of
official harrassment, and the relation of a particular inspection to the
statutory authority relied upon."8
A more difficult question presented by the principal case relates to
the possible use of knowledge gained by an inspector for a subsequent
criminal prosecution. The court considered this issue as prematurely
presented and refused to decide it, but any determination of the valid-
ity of a given inspection process must cope with this problem.'9 The
ordinance provides that, upon discovery of a fire hazard, the fire chief
"shall order such dangerous conditions or material to be removed or
remedied in such manner as may be specified. ' 2 For the city's fire
prevention program to be effective, it will then be necessary to conduct
a follow-up inspection to determine compliance with such an order.
While the ordinance makes no distinction between these inspections, it
would seem that the second inspection is actually a search for criminal
evidence for which the fourth amendment compels a search warrant,2
since noncompliance may result in prosecution.22 The evidence of
probable cause required for issuance of the warrant would have to be
derived independently of knowledge gained during the first inspection.
An assertion that substandard conditions were observed previously,
and that the inspector desired to determine whether or not they had
been corrected as ordered, would be insufficient to constitute probable
cause, since the assumption that the owner had complied would be
just as reasonable as the assumption that he had not.23
While civil inspections of commercial buildings may be constitution-
ally valid without a warrant or probable cause, there remains the
need for a rule to bar from collateral use evidence of criminality
observed during the inspection. The objective of inspection is to cor-
rect fire hazards deemed dangerous to public health and safety, and
the use of evidence for criminal prosecution unrelated to the authoriz-
ing ordinance's purpose would be in excess of that authority. The
development of an exclusionary rule for such evidence is necessary to
avoid transforming a limited inspection authority into a general war-
"Comment, Administrative Searches ad the Fourth Amendment, 30 Mo. L. REv.
612, 614 (1965).
" It might be argued that the first inspection, being the initial step in a series
of events which may culminate in prosecution, requires official compliance with the
probable cause and warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. Such an argument
is, of course, inconsistent with Frank.
SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8.01.060 (1959).
34 WAsH. L. REv. 437 n.6 (1959).
Everett v. Unsworth, 54 Wn. 2d 760, 344 P.2d 728 (1959).
See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 273-74 (1959).
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rant and thereby circumventing the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment.
24
SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH
IMPLIED CONTRACT
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought suit against decedent's estate
for specific performance of an oral contract to convey or devise real
property in return for personal services. An alternative claim asked
for the reasonable value of services rendered and expenses paid by
plaintiffs in decedent's behalf, and at his request, during the three
years preceding his death. Plaintiff wife served as decedent's nurse,
housekeeper and occasional provider during this period.' Plaintiff hus-
band performed various odd jobs at decedent's request.' Throughout
this period, plaintiffs received no compensation beyond infrequent use
of decedent's lake cabin. Two witnesses testified that decedent told
them that he intended to give his lake property to plaintiffs. Dece-
dent's will, however, devised the property to a great-great-niece. At
the close of plaintiffs' uncontroverted evidence, the trial court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss, apparently for failure to establish a
prima facie case.3 Plaintiffs conceded a failure of proof on their
claim for specific performance and appealed only the order dismissing
their claim for reasonable value of services. A divided court reversed
and remanded for a new trial. Held: Clear, cogent and convincing
evidence that personal services which were requested and rendered
with expectation of compensation is sufficient to imply, in fact, a
"See Comment, 11 ViLL. L. Ray. 357, 363-66 (1966). The adumbration of such a
rule can be found in People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.F.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d
452 (Ct App. 1964), in which the court held that evidence of criminal violations
observed by an official conducting a valid inspection was inadmissible. But see
State v. Rees, 139 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa 1966).
'Among other duties, plaintiff wife prepared decedent's meals, did his washing,
occasionally purchased his supplies with her own funds, provided automobile trans-
portation without remuneration for gasoline, kept house, canned food for him, and
cared for his six cats. Decedent was quite ill and suffered serious elimination
problems, making plaintiff's work most unpleasant and difficult.
' These odd jobs included furnace, electrical, and plumbing repairs, and cutting
and hauling firewood.
'"[lit appears the motion for dismissal was granted on the ground that
treating the plaintiffs' evidence as true it was insufficient to establish a prima facie
case. We thus may review the record to determine whether there is sufficient evi-
dence or reasonable inferences therefrom to establish a prima facie case for plain-
tiffs." Jacobs v. Brock, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 865, 869, 406 P.2d 17, 19 (1965). The dissent
disagreed, contending that the lower court had weighed the evidence, and chastised
the majority for making its own finding of fact.
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